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SOCIAL LEGISLATION

When Must A Hospital Challenge
The Medicare Reimbursement Policy?
By Raben L. Schwartz

Bethesda Hospital Association
v.
OtJs R. Bowen

(Docket No. 86·1764)
Argued Febrnary 29, 1988
This is the rare situation in which both sides have asked
the Coun to hear a case-in this instance to clarify the
requirements of the process through which hospitals can
challenge how they have been reimbursed under the Medi·
care program.
ISSUE

The Issue for the Coun is whether the Medicare statute
permits hospitals that do not formally request Medicare
reimbursement for particular items in the cost reports filed
with their fiscal intermediaries (who audit the reports) to
seek reimbursement for those items when they appeal the
fiscal intermediary's decision to the appropriate administra·
tive board or coun.
FACI'S

There are few statutes and regulations as arcane as those
surrounding Medicare and Medicare reimbursement. Until
1983, hospitals (and many other Medicare providers) were
reimbursed for their actual cost of providing care to Medicare
patients. Under this retrospective payment system, each year
each hospital would prepare a cost repon In a form required
by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services. This cost repon would include all of the costs of
operating the hospital, and it would allocate a ponion of
those costs to the care provided to Medicare patients. The
fiscal intermediary, a government contractor and most often a
private insurance company, would review the cost reports in
accordance with current Medicare regulations and issue a
Notice of Program Reimbursement. This notice determined
the total Medicare payment due to the hospital for the year
that was the subject of the cost repon.
Because the hospital would have received estimated
Medicare payments periodically during the year, the notice
would result In the hospital paying the government, or the
government paying the hospital, the difference between the
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estimate and the actual amount due. A hospital dissatisfied
with the result reached by the fiscal intermediary could
appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
(PRRB), and then to the federal courts.
In this case, the Bethesda Hospital Association and the
Deaconess Hospital Association of Cincinnati filed a cost
repon for 1980 with their fiscal intermediary. The repon
claimed reimbursement for their malpractice premium costs
in accord with a formula required by a 1979 Medicare
regulation that was very unfavorable to hospitals. That regula·
tion effectively allocated more of those premiums to non·
Medicare patients than had the previous malpractice premi·
urn allocation rule. In fact, Bethesda and Deaconess (and
virtually all others in the country), thought that the 1979
regulation was invalid and they intended to challenge it.
Despite this, the hospitals "self-disallowed" the additional
reimbursement that they would have been entitled to receive
before the 1979 regulation was adopted because they knew
that the fiscal intermediaries were bound by the 1979 regula·
tion, and thus they knew that they had no chance of winning
their challenge until the issue was reviewed by the PRRB or
the courts.
When the hospitals appealed the result of the fiscal
intermediary's audit to the PRRB, they were told that they
could not raise the propriety of the 1979 malpractice regula·
tion because they had not raised it before the fiscal interme·
diary. Bethesda and Deaconess, along with several other
Ohio hospitals, appealed to the federal district coun, which
determined that the two hospitals were still entitled to raise
their legal objection to the 1979 regulation, even though
they did not raise it with their fiscal intermediary. The coun
of appeals reversed the district coun on that Issue (810 F.2d
558 (1987)), and Bethesda and Deaconess asked the Su·
preme Coun to review the Issue.
There is no question that the other Ohio hospitals, which
did not follow the 1979 regulation when they prepared their
1980 cost reports (or otherwise drew attention to their
objection to the 1979 malpractice regulation in their cost
reports), can challenge the validity of the restrictive 1979
malpractice premium allocation system. In fact, that regula·
tion was found invalid by every one of the several courts
which considered it, and it has now been withdrawn in favor
of a new allocation rule, which is under challenge in other
proceedings.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

This case is very important to some hospital fiscal man·
agement offices and to the Medicare administration, but is of
PREVIEW

limited significance outside of those narrow groups. The
government, which won this case In the court of appeals,
joined with the hospitals to ask the Supreme Court to hear
this case because the courts of appeals are split on the Issue,
the efficient administration of the Medicare system requires
that the question of whether a hospital can appeal a "selfdisallowance" be finally determined and there Is no other
Jnstltutlon that seems to be able to resolve the dispute. Three
appellate courts have determined that the PRRB can hear
self-disallowed claims, two have determined that It cannot,
one circuit Is split on the issue, and one has determined that
the PRRB has discretion to decide whether It will hear these
claims.
The already relatively minor significance of this case is
further diminished by the fact that most hospital reimbursements are now made on a prospective (rather than retrospective) payment system, with hospitals reimbursed a determined amount for every admission, and the cost report
system of reimbursement Is consequently much less Important to most Medicare providers. Despite this, some kinds of
Medicare providers-including children's hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and some outpatient
providers-are still reimbursed on the basis of their costs.
Also, some hospital costs, like the direct costs of medical
education, are still figured this way. In addition, the earlier
cost reports provided the basis of some subsequent prospective payment amounts, so this case Is not entirely of historical
significance.
This case will take on a real and general significance only
if the Court decides to use it as a vehicle to explore some of
the secondary issues raised by the parties. These issues
Include the strength of the presumption favoring judicial
review, which the hospitals believe to be very strong, and the
amount of deference to be accorded the Department of
Health and Human Services in interpreting the statute,
which the government believes to be very great. Finally, the

Issue No.9

Court may be required to determine if an agency can
interpret a statute to effectively cut off judicial review of its
actions without giving formal notice that it interprets its
statute to do this.
ARGUM.ENI'S
For Bethesda Hospllal Assoclallcm and Deaconess Hospltol (Counsel ofRecord, Carel T. Hedlund, 1600Maryland
National Bank Building, Baltimore, MD 21202; telephone
(301) 685-1120)

The Secretary's policy of denying administrative and
thereby judicial review is inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute.
2. Deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute is
not warranted.
3. The statute should not be interpreted to contain an
implied delegation of discretionary power to the Secretary or the PRRB to limit or foreclose administrative and
judicial review.
4. The Secretary cannot preclude judicial review without
notice.
1.

For Otis Bowen, Secretary ofHeallb and Human Services
(Counse~ Andrew]. Pincus, Department ofjustice, WashIngton, DC 20530; telephone (202) 633-2217)

A provider may Invoke the PRRB's jurisdiction only when
it seeks review of a claim raised before the intermediary.
2. Even if the PRRB has power to hear a case in which a
provider did not raise its claim before the intermediary,
the PRRB may exercise its discretion to decline to hear
such a case.
1.

AMICUS BRIEF

In Support ofBetbesdaHospllalAssoclallon

The American Hospital Association
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